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PROPERTY LAW
I. COURT APPLIES DOCTRINE OF Lis Pendens IN FRAUDULENT
CONVEYANCE CLAIM
Section 27-23-10 of the South Carolina Code, codifying the
English Statute of Elizabeth,' provides that a debtor's convey-
ance that was intended to defraud his creditors and others shall
be void.' In Lebovitz v. Mudds the South Carolina Supreme
Court determined the elements required to sustain an action for
fraudulent conveyance under this statute in light of the recent
adoption of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. Addi-
tionally, the court approved the application of the doctrine of lis
pendens to a tort case of fraud and deceit and a separate alleged
fraudulent conveyance.
The court held that the causes of action for fraudulent con-
veyance could be sustained when the plaintiff-appellants prop-
erly alleged that they were within the Statute of Elizabeth4 and
could claim a cause of action as "other types of parties."5 Fur-
ther, the appellants were not required to reduce the debt to
judgment and obtain a nulla bona6 return prior to bringing the
action for fraudulent conveyance under the current South Caro-
lina Rules of Civil Procedure7 or under the common law for ac-
1. An Act Against Fraudulent Deeds, Alienations, & c., 13 Eliz., ch. 5 (1570).
2. S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-23-10 (Law. Co-op. 1976) provides in part:
Every feoffment, gift, grant, alienation, bargain and conveyance of lands,
... made to or for any intent or purpose to delay, hinder or defraud creditors
and others of their just and lawful actions, suits, debts, accounts, damages,
penalties and forfeitures shall be deemed and taken ... to be clearly and ut-
terly void, frustrate and of no effect ....
3. 293 S.C. 49, 358 S.E.2d 698 (1987).
4. S.C. Code Ann. § 27-23-10.
5. 293 S.C. at 52-53, 358 S.E.2d at 700.
6. Nulla bona signifies that there are no goods that the defendant can levy upon
in satisfaction of a judgment. W.J. Klein Co. v. Kneece, 239 S.C. 478, 123 S.E.2d 870
(1962).
7. S.C.R. Civ. P. 18(b), effective July 1, 1985, states in part: "In particular, a plain-
tiff may state a claim for money and a claim to have set aside a conveyance fraudulent as
to him, without first having obtained a judgment establishing the claim for money."
This is the same language as the current FED. R. CIv. P. 18(b), and the last sentence
is in accordance with the UNi. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT, 7A U.L.A. 430 (1985).
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tual fraud.' The interpretation of the South Carolina Rule of
Civil Procedure 18(b) and the reaffirmance of common law indi-
cates the court's willingness in cases of actual fraud to minimize
the hardships imposed on a creditor by delays in obtaining a
judgment and the numerous lawsuits required to obtain a
remedy.
The court also held that the notices of lis pendens should
not have been stricken from the property transferred by the re-
spondents and that when the court granted a request for ex-
traordinary relief, that the lis pendens be cancelled, the effect of
the order was pendente lite. In construing the lis pendens stat-
ute," the court followed a North Carolina case, North Carolina
National Bank v. Evans,10 which construed a similar North Car-
olina statute. 1
In this consolidated case, plaintiff-appellants Lebovitz and
Ender claimed that the defendant-respondents committed fraud
and unfair trade practices while acting as agents for the plain-
tiffs in the purchase of lands on Daufuskie Island, South Caro-
lina. 1 2 The respondents were also partners in a South Carolina
partnership (LUCAB). It was alleged that at approximately the
same time this case was filed, LUCAB, which would have been
liable to Lebovitz and Ender if the case were decided in appel-
lants' favor, transferred its property to the partners. The part-
ners then transferred the assets to a newly formed Illinois part-
nership (DASOCA) of which they were the exclusive partners.
The appellants alleged that the transfers were made without
consideration, rendering LUCAB insolvent. Further, it was al-
leged that the transfers were made with knowledge of appel-
lants' fraud and unfair trade practices claims and, thus, were
made with the actual intent to defraud the appellants.
To provide notice of their claims to set aside the alleged
8. Dennis v. McKnight, 161 S.C. 209, 159 S.E. 555 (1931).
9. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-11-10 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
10. 296 N.C. 374, 250 S.E.2d 231 (1979).
11. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-116 (1983).
12. The amended complaint alleged five causes of action: 1) actual fraud, 2) con-
structive fraud, 3) unfair and deceptive trade practices, 4) negligence, and 5) fraudulent
conveyances. The individual defendants Mudd, Mudd, Jr., and Heltzer are alleged to
have schemed to defraud the appellants by inducing the appellants to purchase property
(and the respondents then purchasing the property at a price well below that quoted to
the appellants), transferring the property through a straw man to the appellants at a
much higher price, and retaining the profits. Record at 8 to 39.
[Vol. 40
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fraudulent conveyances from LUCAB to DASOCA, the appel-
lants ified and served notice of lis pendens covering ten parcels
of property previously owned by LUCAB. Of these ten, only one,
which the respondents and appellants jointly owned, was con-
nected with the tort cause of action consisting of fraud and un-
fair trade practice.
The circuit court, on a motion to dismiss, determined to
rule as a matter of law and exclude evidentiary materials.13
Therefore, under South Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b),
all properly pleaded allegations in the complaints were accepted
as true, but they were not accepted as legal conclusions.14 The
circuit court dismissed the two causes of action alleging fraudu-
lent conveyances because (1) the appellants did not assert that
they were creditors or others and (2) the debt had not been re-
duced to judgment. The court ordered that the notices of lis
pendens be stricken.
The supreme court reversed, holding that the complaints
stated a cause of action for fraudulent conveyances. Under the
Statute of Elizabeth,15 a cause of action is not limited to judg-
ment creditors. The court relied on Dennis v. McKnight 6 for
the proposition that tort claimants alleging a fraudulent convey-
ance also come within protection of the statute. In this case, the
conveyances from LUCAB to DASOCA are alleged to have been
made without consideration, thereby rendering LUCAB insol-
vent (establishing legal fraud) and, furthermore, were made with
the intent to defraud appellants (establishing actual fraud). The
complaint, therefore, was sufficient to bring the appellants
within the statute.
The court also evaluated the fraudulent conveyances claim
under the South Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 18(b), which
allows joinder of claims when one claim is for money damages
(the initial fraud and unfair trade practice claim) and another is
to have a fraudulent claim set aside (the conveyance from LU-
13. Record at 5.
14. H. LIGHTSEY & J. FLANAGAN, SOUTH CAROLINA CIVIL PROCEDURE 276 (1985) (cit-
ing DeBerry v. McCain, 275 S.C. 569, 274 S.E.2d 293 (1981)).
15. S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-23-10 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
16. 161 S.C. 209, 159 S.E. 555 (1931). The court upheld the application of the Us
pendens statute when a widow, bringing a suit for wrongful death of her husband, also
stated a cause of action to have set aside as fraudulent a deed conveying property from
the defendant to his wife.
19881
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CAB to DASOCA). The court, in construing the rule to apply in
this situation, held that even in the absence of South Carolina
Rule of Civil Procedure 18(b), the debt did not have to be re-
duced to judgment and a nulla bona returned."i
Under the Statute of Elizabeth,"s protection is afforded to
creditors and others when a fraudulent conveyance claim is
properly alleged. Although the respondents maintained that the
claims were based on the appellants' "information and belief'19
and lacked the requisite facts to sustain the pleading,20 the court
correctly held that the allegations of backdated deeds, for nomi-
nal or no consideration, and the execution of deeds with specific
intent to defraud are sufficient to meet the statute's require-
ments21 when they are presented to the court on a motion to
dismiss.
Although courts have been reluctant to find actual fraud in
fraudulent conveyances, 22 the determination that the allegations
supported a finding of actual fraud and adherence to the South
Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 18(b) follows the common law
of this state2 3 and other jurisdictions.24
The court also held that notices of lis pendens were prop-
erly filed against the DASOCA property. The lis pendens stat-
ute25 provides that notice may be filed in "an action affecting
title to real property"; it has no limitation that the property in-
17. Id. See also Temple v. Montgomery, 157 S.C. 85, 153 S.E. 640 (1930); Miller v.
Hughes, 33 S.C. 530, 12 S.E. 419 (1890). The court realized, however, that in cases of
constructive fraud, the reduction to judgment had previously been required. Dillon Tire
Serv. v. Pope, 243 S.C. 293, 133 S.E.2d 813 (1963).
18. 13 Eliz. ch. 5 (1570) (codified at S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-23-10 (Law. Co-op. 1976)).
19. Brief of Respondents at 5.
20. See, e.g., Lamar & Rankin Drug Co. v. Jones, 155 Ala. 474, 46 So. 763 (1908),
which held that information and belief must be supported by facts supplying the basis
for the belief.
21. See Record at 35, 36, and 37 (allegations in complaint).
22. Tuller v. Nantahala Park Co., 276 S.C. 667, 281 S.E.2d 474 (1981).
23. 161 S.C. 209, 159 S.E. 555 (1931).
24. 37 C.J.S. Fraudulent Conveyances § 75, at 915 (1955) ("[T]he well-neigh uni-
versal rule is that claims for damages arising from torts and not yet reduced to judgment
are within the protection of the statutes against fraudulent conveyances. . . .") In Note,
Fraudulent Conveyances, 34 S.C.L. REv. 195, 199 (1982), a similar observation was made
that FED. R. Civ. P. 18(b) would allow recovery under an alleged fraudulent conveyance,
whether actual or constructive fraud, while South Carolina (prior to the adoption of the
FED. R. Civ. P. 18(b) as the S.C.R. Civ. P. 18(b)) would not allow the cause of action until
the judgment had been rendered and nulla bona execution returned.
25. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-11-10 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
[Vol. 40
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volved with the tort claim must be the same property attached
as a result of the fraudulent conveyances. In this case, however,
one of ten parcels did fit this dual role. The court cited with
approval North Carolina Bank v. Evans,s0 which construed a
statute similar to the South Carolina lis pendens statute,
27 and
concluded that notice was properly filed against property that
was the subject of a fraudulent conveyance action,
28
Although lis pendens would not be an appropriate remedy
if the appellants were seeking only money damages in a fraud
action,2 the appellants in Lebovitz also were seeking to have the
fraudulent conveyances between LUCAB and DASOCA set
aside ° and, therefore, come within the purview of the lis
pendens doctrine. The use of Iis pendens in such circumstances
is in accordance with the common law31 and is supported by ref-
erence to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 18(b), from which
South Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 18(b) is derived. As dis-
cussed in Moore's Federal Practice:
Joinder in one action of a claim against the debtor and a
claim against the fraudulent transferee will serve (1) to save
expenditure of time and money heretofore necessitated by sep-
arate actions; and (2) to establish a lis pendens as against the
particular property involved in the conveyance which should
prevent further disposal of that property while the creditor is
establishing his claim against the debtor.
32
26. 296 N.C. 374, 250 S.E.2d 231 (1979). The bank brought an action against a
debtor and a purchaser of property to set aside the sale as a fraudulent conveyance and
also filed the notice of lis pendens. The court held that the debtor was not able to estab-
lish that value was given for the property and that the conveyance was not fraudulent.
Also, the bank's claim of relief to have the conveyance set aside was an action that af-
fected title to real property and was, therefore, within the lis pendens statute.
27. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-116 (1983).
28. 293 S.C. at 54, 358 S.E.2d at 701.
29. See 51 Am. JuR. 2D Lis Pendens § 21, at 969 (1970) (citing Parker v. White, 235
N.C. 680, 71 S.E.2d 122 (1952)) (involving alleged fraud in sale of real property). In a
situation where only money damages were sought, the prejudgment attachment statutes
would normally be used. Here, however, the appellants asserted the requisite elements of
lis pendens.
30. Record at 39.
31. See Coleman v. Law, 170 Ga. 906, 154 S.E. 445 (1930); N.C. Nat'l Bank v. Ev-
ans, 296 N.C. 374, 250 S.E.2d 231 (1979); Annotation, Doctrine of Lis Pendens as Appli-
cable to Actions to Avoid Conveyance or Transfer in Fraud of Creditors or to Prevent
Such Conveyance or Transfer, 74 A.L.R. 690 (1931).
32. 3A J. MOORE, W. TAGGART & J. WICKER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, 18.11, at
18-89 (1987).
1988] 209
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The lis pendens remedy has been available in South Caro-
lina for over two hundred years33 to put persons on notice of a
creditor's claim regarding a fraudulent conveyance and recently
has been upheld.3 4 The application of this doctrine to the pre-
sent case follows the general policies to allow notice to be placed
on the DASOCA property to alert potential purchasers of the
pending case.
Finally, the court held that the effect of cancellation of the
notice of lis pendens pursuant to a petition requesting such ex-
traordinary relief, was pendente lite only pending the determi-
nation of the merits of the Iis pendens issue.
The general rule, although subject to exceptions, is that
once the "doctrine of lis pendens comes into operation in con-
nection with a particular litigation, it remains in operation until
the rendition of a final decision that puts a definite end to the
litigation." 35 In this case, the lis pendens issue had been the
subject of three prior orders of the supreme court. In April 1986,
the court held that the cancellation was void and the notice
would remain in effect during the pendency of the appeal. In a
second order, dated July 9, 1986, the court denied the motion for
relief from lis pendens. On November 20, 1986, the court en-
tered a third order in response to a motion seeking extraordi-
nary relief cancelling the notice of lis pendens. This order, how-
ever, merely had the effect of staying resolution of the lis
pendens issue until the appeal on the merits. The fourth, and
final decree, issued in June 1987 was in response to an appeal on
the merits and held that the lis pendens notice was properly
entered.
In conclusion, the supreme court construed South Carolina
Rule of Civil Procedure 18(b) in accordance with the law con-
struing the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 18(b), resulting in a
change in the common law of South Carolina regarding the join-
der of tort and fraudulent conveyance claims. Within the con-
33. See Watlington v. Hanley, 1 S.C. Eq. (1 DeS.) 167 (1787); Reply Brief of Appel-
lants at 8.
34. See Hursey v. Hursey, 284 S.C. 323, 326 S.E.2d 178 (Ct. App. 1985), in which a
lis pendens was sought on property that was subject to both a fraudulent conveyance
and a divorce proceeding. Lebovitz appears to expand this doctrine by applying lis
pendens to property that was not the object of the fraud cause of action.
35. See 51 AM. JuR. 2D Lis Pendens § 32, at 979 (1970) (citing decisions in nine
various states, not including South Carolina).
[Vol. 40
6
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 13
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol40/iss1/13
1988] PROPERTY LAW
text of claims of fraudulent conveyances, the court's analysis of
the appropriateness of the application of the lis pendens doc-
trine was equitable and followed law construing similar statutes
in other states.
Gwendelyn Geidel
II. LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION OF RESTRICTIVE COVENANT BASED
ON DEVELOPER'S INTENT
Satellite dish antennas 6 are new on the residential scene.
Recently the South Carolina Court of Appeals decided a novel
question concerning the applicability of a subdivision's restric-
tive covenant to the installation of a satellite antenna. In Mid-
way Properties v. Pfister7 the court of appeals held that the
language of the particular restrictive covenant s' required ap-
proval of all construction on the lots, the defendants violated
the covenant by installing an unapproved dish antenna, and the
antenna had to be removed. 9 The main issue was the construc-
tion of the language of the covenant. The Pfister court reached
the same result as courts of other jurisdictions faced with the
same issue,40 but for very different reasons.
Philip and Patricia Pfister, the defendants, knew that the
lot they purchased from Midway Properties in Anderson County
was subject to a restrictive covenant.4' They built a house and
later installed an outdoor video dish42 without first submitting
36. In this article the terms "satellite dish antenna," "satellite dish," "dish," "video
antenna," and "video dish" are used interchangeably. All of these terms refer to televi-
sion signal receiving devices used in a residential, rather than commercial, setting.
37. 292 S.C. 104, 354 S.E.2d 926 (Ct. App. 1987).
38. Section XIII of the restrictive covenant reads:
A. No building shall be erected or placed on any lot until the construction
plans and specifications and a plan showing the location of the structure have
been approved by the developer as to the quality of workmanship and materi-
als, harmony of external design with existing structures and as to location with
respect to topography and finish grade elevation. ...
C. No fence, wall, or barrier shall be erected, placed or altered on any lot un-
less similarly approved by the Architectural Committee.
Id. at 105-06, 354 S.E.2d at 927 (emphasis added in part.)
39. Id.
40. See cases cited infra notes 63, 65.
41. Record at 19 (Mr. Pfister's testimony admitting he knew of the covenant).
42. The dish was eleven feet in diameter, fifteen feet high, and made of black wire
mesh. Record at 8, 20.
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plans to the plaintiff developer. The Architectural Control Com-
mittee43 notified the defendants that their dish, an unapproved
barrier, violated Section XIII (C) of the covenant" and had to
be removed. The Pfisters' refusal of this request gave rise to this
action by the developer for a declaratory judgment and for an
injunction to remove the dish.45
The Pfisters made two arguments. First, they argued that
the specific wording of the covenant did not control the con-
struction of the antenna and that the covenant should be strictly
construed against the drafter, Midway Properties, to allow the
least restricted use of the property.46 Alternatively, the Pfisters
argued that "[i]n balancing the equities,47 it would be inequita-
ble for the Court to require the removal of the satellite antenna
[because they] spent significant sums of money in purchasing
43. The Architectural Control Committee was a five-member committee organized
by Midway Properties to regulate the development of the subdivision. Midway's presi-
dent chaired the committee. Record at 10, 16.
44. See the relevant wording of the covenant, supra note 3. The attorney for the
Architectural Committee wrote the Pfisters a letter on behalf of the committee stating:
"This satellite dish is certainly a barrier for sight, sound and air and also should. . . be
approved or disapproved by the Architectural Committee from that standpoint." Record
at 35.
45. 292 S.C. at 105, 354 S.E.2d at 927.
46. Id. at 106, 354 S.E.2d at 927. The rule of strict construction is well established
in South Carolina. Generally, "[riestrictive covenants are to be strictly construed, with
doubts resolved in favor of a free use of property." Butler v. Sea Pines Plantation Co.,
282 S.C. 113, 120, 317 S.E.2d 464, 468 (Ct. App. 1984)(citing Hamilton v. CCM, Inc., 274
S.C. 152, 263 S.E.2d 378 (1980)); see also Edwards v. Surratt, 228 S.C. 512, 90 S.E.2d 906
(1956). Note, however, this general rule is limited: "[C]ovenants. . . should not be con-
strued so as to defeat the plain and obvious purpose of the contractual instrument."
Donald E. Blatz, Inc. v. R.V. Chandler & Co., 248 S.C. 484, 487, 151 S.E.2d 441, 443
(1966) (citations omitted). Cf. Hamilton, 274 S.C. at 157-58, 263 S.E.2d at 381 ("where
the language of a restrictive covenant is equally capable of two or more constructions,
that construction will be adopted which least restricts the property").
47. In Wynock v. Carroll, 289 S.C. 338, 345 S.E.2d 503 (Ct. App. 1986), the court
stated the following equitable test:
[I]n determining the appropriateness of injunctive relief, the courts bal-
ance the equities between the parties and are committed to the relative hard-
ship or balance of convenience standard. So,. . . the court will, in the exercise
of the wide discretion with which it is vested, take into consideration the rela-
tive inconvenience, hardship, or injury, which the parties will sustain by the
granting or refusal of an injunction.
Id. at 340, 345 S.E.2d at 504 (citation omitted). In Wynock the defendant landowner was
forced to remove a parking lot facility built in violation of the local zoning code. But see
Hunnicutt v. Rickenbacker, 268 S.C. 511, 234 S.E.2d 887 (1977) for a case in which the
balance of equities favored the landowner over land use restrictions.
8
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and installing this antenna. '48  The court of appeals, relying
heavily on the trial court's reasoning, rejected both of these ar-
guments. The Pfister court "agree[d] with the trial judge that
the instrument, read as a whole, evidence[d] a plain intent to
place all construction under the control of the Architectural
Committee.149 In essence, the court looked past the express
wording of the documents to Midway's intent to restrict the
land's use." Further, reasoned the court, the drafter would be
burdened if required "to expressly list every conceivable item
which could be placed on a piece of property. ' 51 In rejecting the
defendants' balancing of the equities argument, the court fo-
cused on the fact that the Pfisters had freely subjected them-
selves to the restrictions and that other landowners in the subdi-
vision had relied on the restrictions in purchasing their own
properties.2
Pfister represents the great lengths to which South Carolina
courts will extend themselves to enforce restrictive covenants.
Admittedly, interpretation of restrictive covenants is not an ex-
act science.53 Modern courts, including the Pfister court, are
48. Brief of Appellant at 4.
49. 292 S.C. at 106, 354 S.E.2d at 927. The trial judge arguably based his ruling on
an interpretation of the express wording of the covenant-whether the satellite dish was
a "building," "structure," or "barrier." The judge relied heavily on the authority of two
annotations in rendering his opinion. Record at 28 (trial judge's "Conclusions of Law").
Both these annotations focus entirely on the use of specific words in various covenants.
See Annotation, What Constitutes a "Structure" Within Restrictive Covenant, 75
A.L.R.31 1095 (1977); Annotation, What Constitutes a "Building" Within Restrictive
Covenant, 18 A.L.R.3D 850 (1968). Note that the language of the covenant, supra note 38,
includes both the words "building" and "structure." "Structure," however, does not have
a separate and distinct meaning because it clearly refers back to the term "building."
Thus, any attempt to classify the dish as a "structure" is an error. The Pfister court,
although it agreed with the trial judge, neither expressly accepted nor rejected the trial
judge's focus on the exact wording of the covenant.
50. The trial judge relied on the following factors to determine the developer's in-
tent, which was "to create and maintain a high quality, pleasant and appealing commu-
nity": (1) the testimony describing the nature of the subdivision; (2) the entire covenant;
(3) the requirements that all lots be more than one acre, that permissible activities be
controlled, and that the houses be large; and (4) the control of all streets by the home-
owners. Record at 29 (trial judge's "Conclusions of Law").
51. 292 S.C. at 106, 354 S.E.2d at 927.
52. Id.
53. Donald E. Blatz, Inc. v. R.V. Chandler & Co., 248 S.C. 484, 489, 151 S.E.2d 441,
444 (1966) ("It has frequently been pointed out that cases involving restrictive covenants
present such wide differences in circumstances that. . . each case must be decided on its
own facts.").
9
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turning away from strict construction. 4 The Pfister court cited
Davey v. Artistic Builders, Inc.55 as its source of the governing
law. Yet, the court relied on only a part of the Davey rule,5" ex-
cluding an essential portion of that rule: "[W]here the language
of the restrictions is equally capable of two or more different
constructions that construction will be adopted which least re-
stricts the use of the property. ' 7 Under Davey, a party wishing
to have a covenant strictly construed can show that two or more
constructions exist because two or more reasonable inferences
can be drawn from the disputed language of the instrument."
Apparently, at the trial level in Pfister there was considerable
dispute as to whether the words "building," "barrier," or "struc-
ture" could be construed to include a dish antenna. The Pfister
court did not decide which section of the covenant was violated
or which term applied to the dish.59 Yet, isn't it reasonable that
a satellite dish is not a "building" or a "barrier" as these words
are used in Section XIII of the covenant? If so, under the rule of
Davey the instant covenant gives rise to two or more different
constructions and should be construed against Midway-the op-
posite result from the actual holding. By deciding that the de-
veloper's intent, rather than any particular word or wording of
the covenant, prohibited the video dish, the court of appeals en-
courages drafting of restrictions in indefinite terms-a step to-
ward imprecision.
The court of appeals also reasoned that requiring express
restrictions in covenants might create a significant burden on
the drafter."0 There is no burden, however, if all that is required
for clarity is a simple catchall phrase. For example, consider a
suggested revision of Section XIII (A) of the Pfister covenant
54. 20 Am. Jun. 2D Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions § 187 (1986). Even
under the modern approach, however, courts employ strict construction where ambigu-
ous language creates a doubt as to the intentions of the parties.
55. 263 S.C. 431, 211 S.E.2d 235 (1975).
56. The court only quotes Davey as follows: "The general rule of strict construction
of restrictions ... is not applicable if it will defeat the plain and obvious purpose of the
restrictions." 292 S.C. at 106, 354 S.E.2d at 927.
57. 263 S.C. at 436-37, 211 S.E.2d at 237 (citations omitted).
58. Id. at 436, 211 S.E.2d at 236. Construing an ambiguous land plat, the Davey
court stated that "there is nothing on the plat to give rise to any inference. . . and to
the contrary at least one reasonable inference. . . is that. . . ... Id. (emphasis added).
59. See supra note 49.
60. See supra text accompanying note 51.
214 [Vol. 40
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(with the revisions indicated by italics): "No building or other
structure shall be erected. . . until a plan. . . showing the lo-
cation of the building or structure has been approved. . .. "61
Only five words were added, but the word "structure" takes on a
separate meaning from the word "building." '62 Other jurisdic-
tions consider this "structure" wording determinative when or-
dering the removal of residential dish antennas.6 3 These recent
cases demonstrate that the inclusion of the "structure" wording
into Section XIII (A) of Pfister's covenant would have greatly
reduced the ambiguity of the document without burdening the
drafter. 4 Still other jurisdictions have required more precise
language to justify removing unauthorized dishes.6 5 No cases
could be found holding a dish to be a "building" as was sug-
gested by the findings of the trial court in Pfister.6
Perhaps most troublesome for the practitioner is the some-
what circular reasoning used in Pfister to balance the equities
against the defendants. The Pfisters lost because they freely
subjected themselves to the restrictions on which fellow prop-
erty owners also relied. 7 Yet if the intent of the developer, and
not the express wording of the covenant, ultimately defines the
restriction, did the Pfisters knowingly and freely subject them-
61. Compare this revised covenant with the actual Pfister covenant, supra note 38.
62. In the original text the terms "building" and "structure" are synonymous. See
supra notes 38, 49.
63. In Prinzing v. Jockey Club of North Port Owners Ass'n, 483 So. 2d 833 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1986), the court held that the unauthorized installation of a satellite dish
as a "structure" violated the following restrictive covenant: "No building, fence, wall or
other structure shall be . . . erected ... until the plans. . . have been. . . approved
... by the Environmental Control Committee." Id. at 834 (emphasis added). Again, di-
rectly on point is the Oregon Court of Appeals' decision in Shoreline Estates Homeown-
ers Ass'n v. Loucks, 84 Or. App. 302, 733 P.2d 942 (1987). In Loucks an injunction forced
the defendant property owners to remove unapproved dish antennas because they were
"other structures" prohibited by the following covenant restriction: "No dwelling house
... fence, wall or other structures. . . shall be erected ... unless a. . . plan[] therefor
. . . shall have been ... approved by the homeowners association. . . ... Id. at 304, 733
P.2d at 942-43 (emphasis added.)
64. See supra note 63.
65. See, e.g., Schreiber v. Cicconi, 351 Pa. Super. 1, -, 504 A.2d 1327, 1328
(1986) (a satellite dish is a "tower" and is prohibited by a covenant restricting construc-
tion of radio, television, or shortwave reception towers); DeNina v. Bammel Forest Civic
Club, 712 S.W.2d 195, 198 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986) (satellite dish violated restrictive cove-
nant because it was both a "television or radio aerial wire" and an "improvement" as
prohibited by the restrictions).
66. See supra note 49.
67. 292 S.C. 104, 106, 354 S.E.2d 926, 927 (Ct. App. 1987).
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selves to these restrictions? Rather, it is likely that they never
would have interpreted the word "building" or "barrier" to
mean dish antenna. Similarly, if the developer intended the re-
strictive covenant to regulate more than the common meaning of
the words would indicate, could the other property owners real-
istically argue that they relied on the restrictions in purchasing
their property?
South Carolina courts favor restrictive covenants; thus, the
practitioner can learn two lessons from Pfister. First, when
drafting a restrictive covenant requiring approval of construc-
tion to be undertaken on subdivision lots, use simple catchall
phrases to cover the myriad of different circumstances; draft
covenants to provide for future technological advances. Second,
when representing clients as buyers in real estate transactions
involving restrictive covenants, warn them that the covenant
may be enforceable in situations beyond the common meaning of
the words of the document.
Jeffrey Albert Winkler
III. COURT REFUSES TO ANALYZE FACTS WITH RESPECT TO
EACH ELEMENT OF ADVERSE POSSESSION
Adverse possession is an area of the law that requires very
specific elements to be proven before a claim will be upheld. The
possession must be actual, open, notorious, hostile, continuous,
and exclusive.68 In Butler v. Lindseys the South Carolina Court
of Appeals was faced with a claim of adverse possession and an
interesting fact situation. While the decision does not seem to
change the law in South Carolina, the court's refusal to analyze
the facts with respect to each required element of adverse pos-
session may have muddied the waters. This survey analyzes
these elements in view of the specific facts of this case.
The property in dispute consists of a one-acre tract of land
located on Yonges Island in Charleston County. Butler, the
plaintiff, is the titled owner of the property. He uses the land
primarily for hunting. Lindsey, the defendant, is the party
claiming adverse possession. When Lindsey acquired his land,
68. See MulHis v. Winchester, 237 S.C. 487, 491, 118 S.E.2d 61, 63 (1961).
69. 293 S.C. 466, 361 S.E.2d 621 (Ct. App. 1987).
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which adjoins Butler's property, from Riser, the prior owner, in
1964, the disputed parcel was included in the conveyance. 0
Lindsey then used the disputed land for camping and made
some improvements prior to 1977, at which time he built a dock.
In December 1985 Butler sued Lindsey for trespass. Lindsey
counterclaimed, alleging he owned the property by adverse pos-
session. The Master found that Lindsey had trespassed on But-
ler's property and did not uphold the claim of adverse posses-
sion. The court of appeals affirmed the findings of the Master
that Lindsey had not acquired the land by adverse possession."1
The Master concluded, and the court of appeals agreed, that
Lindsey's open, notorious, and visible use of the property did
not begin until 1977 when he built a dock on the disputed prop-
erty."2 Therefore, Lindsey's possession was only considered open
for eight years instead of the required ten years. 3 There were,
however, many other facts in this case which indicate that Lind-
sey's occupation was open, notorious, and visible as early as
1975. Lindsey testified that in 1966 he placed a mobile home on
the disputed property and installed a culvert under a marsh area
so he could drive his tractor onto the disputed property to clear
the land. Lindsey also paid taxes on the property and intro-
duced tax receipts beginning in 1972."4 To determine if posses-
sion is open, notorious, and visible, the facts and circumstances
of each case must be examined. Acts of a possessory nature
should be considered collectively rather than independently.7
Considering these facts collectively, Lindsey seems to have a
strong case for open, notorious, and visible possession.
An even stronger case can be made for open, notorious, and
visible possession when the parties have been involved in dis-
70. Although Lindsey claimed diligently in his brief to the court that the land was
his by way of his chain of title, the court did not view this as an issue.
71. The Master awarded Butler damages of $900. He also ruled that Butler should
compensate Lindsey in the amount of $4,500 for improvements made to the property
under the Betterment Act. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 27-27-10 to 27-27-100 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
72. 293 S.C. at 471, 361 S.E.2d at 626.
73. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-67-210 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
74. The payment of taxes is not sufficient by itself to establish adverse possession;
however, many courts weigh this fact heavily in support of adverse possession. See 3 Am.
JuR. 2D Adverse Possession § 165 (1986). Many courts also view the failure to pay taxes
as a circumstance that weakens a claim of adverse possession. Harrelson v. Reaves, 219
S.C. 394, 401, 65 S.E.2d 478, 481 (1951).
75. 2 C.J.S. Adverse Possession § 49 (1972).
1988]
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putes or controversies regarding the property, and the person
claiming adverse possession maintains his right to possession
throughout the dispute.7" In 1975 Butler's attorney wrote Lind-
sey a letter which stated that Lindsey was trespassing upon But-
ler's property and that if he continued to trespass, appropriate
legal action would be taken. While this letter alone may not
have been sufficient to prove Lindsey's possession was open,
notorius, and visible," viewed in light of the other facts of this
case, the evidence seems to weigh in his favor.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Gardner took a much
stronger stand on the issue of the 1975 letter from Butler's at-
torney to Lindsey.7 s He based his opinion on the rule that an
"owner's actual knowledge of adverse possession is equivalent to
and dispenses with the necessity of open and notorious posses-
sion. ' '79 Since Butler's attorney found Lindsey's deed from
Riser,8 which clearly showed the disputed property as being
conveyed to Lindsey, Butler had actual notice that Lindsey was
claiming his land. Under the rule, Butler's knowledge of Lind-
sey's adverse possession dispenses with the need to prove open,
notorious, and visible possession.
Although the rule that actual notice of the true owner dis-
penses with the requirement for open possession has not been
adopted in South Carolina as such, some cases have alluded to
it. In Graniteville Co. v. Williams81 the court found that al-
though the true owner did not have actual knowledge of the ad-
verse claim, the possession was so open, notorious, and visible
that the true owner should have had knowledge of the adverse
possession.2 This seems to imply that if the true owner did have
actual knowledge of the adverse possession, it would not have
been necessary to prove the possession was open, notorious, and
visible. The supreme court and the court of appeals, however,
have made it clear that included in the elements of adverse pos-
session are the requirements that the possession be open, notori-
76. Id.
77. Id. § 52.
78. 293 S.C. at 479-80, 361 S.E.2d at 629 (Gardner, J., dissenting).
79. Id, at 484, 361 S.E.2d at 632 (citing 2 C.J.S. Adverse Possession § 51 (1972)).
80. 293 S.C. at 479, 361 S.E.2d at 629.
81. 209 S.C. 112, 39 S.E.2d 202 (1946).
82. Id. at 120-21, 39 S.E.2d at 206.
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ous, and visible.83 A person claiming adverse possession should
not rely on the fact that the true owner had actual knowledge,
although this might strengthen his claim.
The court also discussed whether Lindsey's possession was
continuous and exclusive. The court held that Lindsey's acts of
possession did not meet the necessary requirement of exclusive
possession because of evidence that Butler continued to use the
property as well.s4 Butler testified that he and his sons occasion-
ally hunted on the property. He also said that he had lived on
Edisto Island for thirty-four years and had returned to his farm,
which supposedly included the disputed property, about three
years before the institution of the action against Butler. In his
dissent, Justice Gardner argued that, "the hunting excursions
several times a year which Butler maintains are an effective as-
sertion of his ownership are too sporadic to defeat Lindsey's
claim of exclusivity." 5
The dissenting opinion presents the interesting question of
whether it takes more for the true owner to interrupt continuous
possession than for the adverse possessor to meet the required
element of continuous possession. The general rule is that ad-
verse possession must be continuous and uninterrupted for the
full statutory period. The moment possession is interrupted, the
law immediately returns constructive possession to the true
owner.8 6 On the other hand, "[a]cts of adverse possession, or acts
of ownership, with regard to open, wild, unfenced lands,. . . are
only required to be exercised in such way and in such manner as
is consistent with the use to which the lands may be put.2
8
7
The property in this case is suited only for recreational pur-
83. See Mullis v. Winchester, 237 S.C. 487, 491, 118 S.E.2d 61, 63 (1961) (adverse
possession must be actual, open, notorious, hostile, continuous, and exclusive for entire
statutory period); King v. Hawkins, 282 S.C. 508, 511, 319 S.E.2d 361. 363 (Ct. App.
1984) (all elements of adverse possession must exist). See also 3 AM. JUR. 2D Adverse
Possession § 8 (1986) (footnotes omitted) ("If any one of the elements necessary to con-
stitute adverse possession is absent, title by adverse possession cannot be gained.").
84. 293 S.C. at 472, 361 S.E.2d at 624.
85. Id. at 482, 361 S.E.2d at 631 (Gardner, J., dissenting). In support of this pro-
position, the dissenting judge cited a "long list of cases cited in West's South Carolina
Digest, Adverse Possession, Key No. 24 (1952)." Id. The digest cites five cases, all of
which stand for the proposition that occasional and temporary use or occupation does
not constitute adverse possession, not whether it is capable to defeat adverse possession.
86. 237 S.C. at 496, 118 S.E.2d at 65.
87. Id.
19881
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poses such as hunting or boat-docking. The dissent seems to be
saying that the true owner of this type of land has to prove more
than the fact that he hunted on it to interrupt the continuous
possession of the adverse possessor. If this is the case, adverse
possession can be used as a weapon against any owner of wild,
uncultivated land. In order to defeat a claim of adverse posses-
sion, an owner of land that is suited only for seasonal or recrea-
tional activities should only have to prove that he used the land
for those activities. Anything more would be too great a burden
on owners of this type of land and would be inconsistent with
the policy behind adverse possession.
Adverse possession is based on the theory that the true
owner of property has failed to protect his rights in ownership
for the statutory period and, thus, has acquiesced in the transfer
of ownership.88 Therefore, an owner who uses his property in the
manner for which it is suited has not acquiesced in the transfer
of ownership to an adverse possessor. In cases involving adverse
possession, the courts give nearly every presumption to the true
owner.8 9 For this reason, a greater burden should not be placed
on the true owner than on a person claiming adverse possession
when the property involved only can be used for seasonal or rec-
reational purposes. The majority's decision that Lindsey's pos-
session was not exclusive because Butler continued to use the
property is consistent with the law in this state and the policy
behind adverse possession.
The majority did not discuss the issue of whether Lindsey
met the requirement of hostile possession. The supreme court in
Brown v. Clemens"° reaffirmed its position that possession under
a mistaken belief that property is one's own cannot constitute
hostile possession.9' The court of appeals gave its opinion of this
position in Lusk v. Callaham: 2 "South Carolina's law on ad-
verse possession apparently favors intentional wrongdoers [over
88. 3 AM. Jun. 2D Adverse Possession § 4 (1986).
89. See Mullis v. Winchester, 237 S.C. at 491, 118 S.E.2d at 63 (the burden of proof
of adverse possession is on the party relying thereon); Knight v. Hilton, 224 S.C. 452,
456, 79 S.E.2d 871, 873 (1954) (possession is presumed to follow the legal title to land);
King v. Hawkins, 282 S.C. 508, 511, 319 S.E.2d 361, 363 (Ct. App. 1984) (doctrine of
adverse possession must be strictly construed in favor of the owner of the title to land).
90. 287 S.C. 328, 338 S.E.2d 338 (1985).
91. See id. at 331, 338 S.E.2d at 339.
92. 287 S.C. 459, 339 S.E.2d 156 (Ct. App. 1986).
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honest, mistaken entrants] and. . our powers, as an intermedi-
ate appellate court do not permit us to change [the law as it
stands]. 9 3 If the court of appeals had addressed the issue of
hostile possession, undoubtedly Lindsey's possession would not
have been characterized as hostile. In his brief to the court,
Lindsey testified that he believed the land was his; he went to
great lengths to prove his title to the property. Therefore, since
Lindsey was operating on the mistaken belief that he owned the
disputed property, his possession was not hostile.
The court of appeals in this case decided that Lindsey did
not meet the requirements for adverse possession, especially the
requirement of exclusivity. By not analyzing the facts of this
case carefully in view of the elements required to prove adverse
possession, however, the court has made it difficult for future
parties to predict whether or not their actions constitute adverse
possession.
Allison Molony Carter
93. Id. at 462, 339 S.E.2d at 461 (citation omitted). See also 3 AM. Ju. 2D Adverse
Possession § 56 (1986). "It is widely held that possession is not the less hostile because
the claimant takes possession of the land innocently and through mistake or ignorance as
to ownership." Id. This section noted that most cases holding that possession of land
under mistake or ignorance is not hostile possession generally are older cases.
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